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Abstract. As the amount of information resources on the Web keeps
increasing so are the concerns for information integrity, con¯dentiality
and authenticity. In Web 2.0 users are producers as well as consumers of
content and metadata, which makes guaranteeing the authenticity and
integrity of information critical. The scale of the Web requires that any
proposals in this direction require minimal (if any) infrastructural or
administrative changes. This paper proposes the use of ID-based cryp-
tography (IBC) to address requirements for integrity and authenticity of
Web resources using either the URL/URI of a resource or the DNS name
part of if. This approach presents certain challenges, which are discussed
along with the pros and cons of di®erent designs and implementations.
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1 Introduction
The number of Internet and Web users has been increasing at very high rates
over the last decade and, considering that Internet penetration in developing
countries is still relatively low there is space for ongoing increase in the coming
years. The amount of content that is exchanged is constantly growing and a
number of content distribution and delivery infrastructures (peer-to-peer, con-
tent repositories) are proving particularly popular. Web 2.0 applications allow
users to be not just content consumers but also producers. The importance of
content in this emerging paradigm of Web-service deployment and use has al-
ready been identi¯ed; according to O'Reilly [10] "data is the next Intel inside".
Currently there is research in progress on a new content-centric communica-
tion paradigm that aspires to transform networking by focusing not on enabling
the communication between network end-points but on identifying content to
be obtained from networks using client-server, peer-to-peer or other types of
exchanges. There are expectations that this e®ort will lead to more e±cient
networks in terms of content distribution and more e±cient services ([9], [11]).2 T. Tiropanis and T. Dimitriou
This vision of content-centric communication however, is based on the as-
sumption that a network infrastructure will be able to (i) identify each Web
resource uniquely and (ii) provide guarantees on the integrity and authenticity
of Web resources since they can be obtained not exclusively from their source
network end-point but over a peer-to-peer or other type of content distribution
network. The requirements of integrity and authenticity are increasingly critical
as the content currently produced by an already large user base is set to keep
growing. To this end we propose the use of Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC)
as an e±cient and scalable way of guaranteeing the authenticity and integrity
of Web resources using an IBC-based system for e±ciently signing and verifying
Web based content. Our proposal involves the use of the URL/URIs (or the
DNS name part of URL/URIs) of resources as IBC identi¯ers of every resource
to be disseminated over the Web, Peer-to-Peer or other content dissemination
networks combined. We also propose the use of identity-based digital signatures.
The proposed approach does not require infrastructural changes and we be-
lieve it can therefore be seamlessly introduced, making use of the existing XML
Signature Syntax and Processing Standard of the W3C [14].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing
literature on Identify-Based Cryptography (IBC), on Web 2.0 applications and
on content dissemination infrastructure. Section 3 describes in detail how IBC
can provide an e±cient and scalable way to address integrity and authenticity
concerns in content-centric communication. Section 4 discusses di®erent deploy-
ment scenarios over the existing Web infrastructure, while Section 5 provides
a discussion on the proposed approach and identi¯es further work items and
related research directions.
2 Background
2.1 Supporting Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) on the Internet
Identity-based cryptography (IBC) was ¯rst introduced by Shamir back in 1984
[13]. While the original scheme of Shamir supported only signature operations,
recently, there has been an increased interest in the use of IBC which was due
to the discovery of a secure Identity Based Encryption scheme based on pairings
over elliptic curves by Boneh and Franklin [1].
In an identity-based cryptosystem, public keys can be derived from arbitrary
strings while the corresponding private keys are generated and distributed by an
associated Trusted Authority (TA). Thus an identity-based cryptosystem enjoys
most of the bene¯ts of public key cryptography without the need for certi¯cates
and the problems they present. This in turn leads to a more lightweight approach
to deploying public key cryptography [12]. In the sequel we review some basic
IBC systems that have been proposed to date.
Boneh et al. [2] proposed a new approach to certi¯cate revocation centered
around the concept of an on-line SEmi-trusted Mediator called the SEM. The
use of the SEM in conjunction with a simple threshold variant of the RSAIBC for Integrity and Authenticity of Web Resources 3
cryptosystem enables the quick revocation of all security capabilities of a user.
The proposal of mediated RSA was then used in an identity based setting in [3]
as a simple solution and alternative to the Weil pairing scheme of [1].
One of the advantages of PKIs is that they can be organized into hierarchies
which re°ect the internal structure of a large organization or group. Recent
work, however, has demonstrated the ability to implement similar hierarchies in
an IBC context ([6, 7]). In [17], this is taken one step further and an attempt
was made to integrate this approach into existing standards and software, so as
to ease deployment.
Finally, Crampton et al. [4] discuss how various Identity-based cryptographic
techniques can be used to provide web services security. In particular, the au-
thors compare Identity-based with traditional, certi¯cate based techniques and
they show how the ¯rst type can be used to secure XML messages in a more
lightweight way compared to the second one.
2.2 Digital signatures for Web resources
The need to provide digital signatures for Web resources has been identi¯ed
by the W3C and the IETF which engaged in common standardization activ-
ity (www.w3.org/Signature) and compiled requirements for XML Signatures in
terms of a data model, syntax, format and processing (RFC2807 [15]). The core
standard to emerge from this activity is the \XML Signature Syntax and Pro-
cessing" [14] standard, which provides for digital signatures as XML documents.
XMLDsig can be used to sign not only XML documents but also resources in
other formats. To verify the authenticity and integrity of a resource, one needs
to have or obtain the key to be used; in a PKI setting, this is the public key
of the entity that signed the resource. Considering that a large number of Web
resources are speci¯ed in XML and that the use of the XML-compatible version
of HTML (xHTML) is widely used today, it seems that XMLDsig provides a
number of ways to package signatures into a large number of Web resources
without changes to existing Web infrastructure.
3 IBC for Web resources
Our proposal is based on mediated RSA that can be used to guarantee the
integrity and authenticity of Web resources. The main idea behind this scheme
(and any other IBC solution) is to generate and use public keys based on publicly
available information that can be used to identify users or resources. On the
other hand, private keys are generated by the Trusted Authority (TA) who
possesses a master secret key (Section 3.1). Then, in Section 3.2, we explain
what modi¯cations (and simpli¯cations) will be made in order to apply it for
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3.1 Mediated RSA (mRSA)
One of the mRSA advantages is its transparency: in signature mode, mRSA
yields standard RSA signatures which are much easier to incorporate with exist-
ing protocols. Mediated RSA involves a special entity called the SEM (SEcurity
Mediator) which is a partially trusted server. To sign or decrypt a message,
user Alice (one of the characters featuring in most cryptography scenarios) must
obtain a message-speci¯c token from the SEM.
The main idea behind mRSA is the splitting of an RSA private key into
two parts using threshold cryptography. One part is given to the user while the
other is given to the SEM. When the user and the SEM cooperate, the system
is functionally equivalent to standard RSA. The fact that the private key is not
held entirely by any one party is transparent to the outside, i.e. to those who use
the corresponding public key to verify the signature (for more details see [3]).
3.2 Creating an Identity based Infrastructure for Resource
Authenticity
Our proposal uses mRSA to address the problem of authenticity and integrity
of Web resources. Consider a set of services o®ered by some organization and
a set of recourses associated with each such service. Ideally, we would like any
third party to be able to authenticate these resources without the use of public
key infrastructures or complicated protocols.
The basic idea behind mRSA is the use of a single common RSA modulus N
among all users of a system. In our case, however, the \users" are the services
o®ered by the organization with resources tied to these services. These resources
must be integrity protected and authenticated by anyone interacting with a
particular service. Thus, these resources correspond to the \messages" that need
to be signed and must bear the signature of the corresponding service.
Using the same modulus by multiple entities in a normal RSA setting is
totally insecure since anyone, using its own knowledge of a single key-pair, can
factor the modulus and compute the other entities' private keys. However, this
does not apply in our setting since the private key is shared between the entity
and the SEM. Thus an attacker must compromise both to undermine the security
of the system.
In the following, we use the full name of a service as the unique identi¯er
(public key) for that service. We use the notation IDService to denote the identity
that will be used to compute the public RSA exponent. During initialization,
a trusted authority (TA) sets up the RSA modulus N for all the services of
the organization. N is equal to the product of two large safe primes p and q.
The public exponent eService is the result of a hash function such as SHA1 on
IDService, with the rightmost bit set to one so that with high probability eService
is relatively prime to Á(N). This process is shown below:IBC for Integrity and Authenticity of Web Resources 5
Generate Public Key for IDService
Let k be the security parameter (say k = 2048)
{ Generate random k=2-bit primes r and s such that p = 2r + 1
and q = 2s + 1 are also primes.
{ Set N = pq
{ For a particular service identi¯ed by IDService
1. Set eService = hash(IDService) k 1
2. Set d = 1=eService mod Á(N)
3. Set dService equal to a random number in ZN ¡ f0g
4. Set dSEM = d ¡ dService mod Á(N)
Once the private key is generated for a particular service, it can be used
to sign a resource R through collaboration with the SEM. In what follows, we
assume the existence of an appropriate encoding scheme that can be used to
break the multiplicative properties of RSA. Typically, one can use the Proba-
bilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) for RSA that can be found in then Public-Key
Cryptography family of Standards PKCS#1. RSA-PSS incorporates processing
schemes designed to provide additional security for RSA signatures. This en-
coding scheme, although not shown in detail, should be used and is denoted by
Hash-PSS in the following description:
Sign resource R
{ Set h equal to Hash-PSS(R)
{ Compute partial signatures PSSEM and PSService as follows:
1. PSSEM = hdSEM mod N
2. PSService = hdService mod N
{ Set S = PSSEM ¢ PSService mod N
{ Return signature S
Finally, any interested party that wants to ensure the authenticity of the
resource R, it can do so by ¯rst computing the public key eService from available
information and then verifying the signature S.
Verify Signature S on resource R
{ Retrieve domain modulus N
{ Set eService = hash(IDService) k 1
{ Compute h = SeService mod N
{ Verify whether h is equal to Hash-PSS(R)
Security issues
The security of this scheme depends on whether someone can break into the
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is a safe assumption to make since the SEM can reside in hardened server that
is more resistant to break-ins than usual machines.
This also solves the problem of the common modulus since even if a server
is compromised, no attacker can use the key dService to sign resources without
the collaboration of the SEM. Additionally, knowing dService for a particular
service does not leak any information about either the primes that constitute
the modulus or the private keys of other services. This is because both keys dSEM
and dService are random quantities. Using a simulation argument, one can show
that any attack that takes advantage of one of the two keys could be turned into
an attack to standard RSA [3]. Thus knowledge of one of these keys does enable
the attacker to sign fake resources (details omitted due to space restrictions).
4 IBC over the existing Web Infrastructure
4.1 IBC over the existing Web protocols
In our proposal, IBC is to be used to verify Web resources that can be identi¯ed
by their original URL or URI. This is achieved by applying the IBC scheme of
Section 3.2, using the URL/URI (or the DNS name portion of it) as part of
the key and by using the XMLDsig standard format and processes. In this way,
checking the authenticity and integrity of a resource can be more e±cient in
comparison to PKI-based schemes as the URL/URI of the obtained resource is
well known and the modulus N for the domain of the resource can be known or
promptly obtained from a secure server or DNSSEC [5].
Although the role of the URL is to provide the location of resources instead
of identi¯cation, we assume that when a resource is not identi¯ed by a URI, its
URL serves as its identi¯er. We make a distinction between an administrative
domain and a DNS name. An administrative domain can manage one or more
DNS names. The DNS name portion of a URL/URI is the host ¯eld of the
authority component of a URL or URI [16].
The digital signature for a resource can indicate whether the signature was
produced using the whole of the URL/URI as key or just the DNS name in it,
depending on the policy of the domain from which the resource originates. E®ec-
tively, our proposal is for two di®erent modes of IBC-based resource validation:
{ MODE 1: The `modulus N' of the domain is used in combination with the
DNS name part of the resource URL/URI to sign it. This means that the same
private key can be used to sign any document in a speci¯c domain regardless of
its URL/URI. This can be °exible in terms of private key and digital signature
management. On the other hand, there is a higher risk in using a single private
key to sign all domain resources.
{ MODE 2: The `modulus N' of the domain is used in combination with
the whole URL/URI to sign it. This requires a di®erent private key for each
URL/URI in a domain. This makes the management of private keys and dig-
ital signatures in a domain more complex but is ideal in cases when URIs
represent user identities, such as OpenIDs.IBC for Integrity and Authenticity of Web Resources 7
Our proposal requires no changes to existing protocols and infrastructure,
only some extra functionality on the client (e.g. Web browser) side, which can
be implemented as a client plug-in. The KeyInfo element of a XMLDsig signature
can be used to indicate the mode of validation the client is expected to use (Mode
1 or Mode 2).
Fig. 1. Domain-wide IBC deployment for verifying Web resources.
Figure 1 shows an example of an administrative domain myserver.com, which
runs three di®erent servers with three di®erent DNS names (www.myserver.com,
betamyserver.com and other.myserver.com). The TA of the administrative do-
main myserver.com will provide the modulus N for all three DNS names and
the SEM of myserver.com will sign each resource as detailed in Section 3.2. A
client (Web browser, P2P client or other) can obtain and cache the `modulus
N' for any of the three DNS domains that can appear in URL/URIs, using a
trusted server or secure DNS. When a client obtains a signed resource from these
domains it will be able to verify its authenticity and integrity.
In order to support authenticity and integrity checks for non URL-based
resources, the use of IBC for URI-identi¯ed resources can be implemented. Unlike
a URL, a URI does not necessarily correspond to a communication end-point
from which a resource can be obtained { it can be just an identi¯er. However,
both URLs and URIs are expected to be maintained by the domain they belong
to. For this reason, resources that claim to be identi¯ed by a URI can be checked
for their authenticity and integrity by a browser, program or user by using the
`modulus N' of the domain name portion of the URI. In this way, it would8 T. Tiropanis and T. Dimitriou
be possible to obtain any resource identi¯able by a URI/URL via any type of
content dissemination infrastructure and still be able to verify its authenticity
and integrity. The 'modulus N' can be obtained in a number of ways as discussed
next in Section 4.2.
The proposed two modes of resource validation can cater for di®erent re-
quirements of authenticity and integrity checks and support both domain-signed
resources (Mode 1) or resources signed by individuals (Mode 2 for OpenID).
4.2 Scenarios for IBC deployment on the Web
The following scenarios are envisaged for the deployment of IBC based authen-
tication and integrity of Web resources that can be identi¯ed by a URL or URI.
In these scenarios, the content identi¯ed by a URL or URI can be obtained over
a number of di®erent content delivery channels, not necessarily the Web. How-
ever, the Web infrastructure is used to obtain the `modulus N' for the domains
of each URL/URI.
Scenario 1: IBC for URL-based or URI-identi¯ed resources
(`modulus N' maintained per DNS domain)
In this scenario the `modulus N' for the domain can be obtained by the client:
{ From a Web server on the domain of the speci¯c URL/URI. This requires
the client to issue an HTTP GET request for a standard relative URL
on the domain. For example, `modulus N' for URL/URI of domain www.
myserver.com could be obtained by issuing a GET request for the reserved
relative URL `modulusN.xml' to the server of the domain, with absolute URL:
http://www.myserver.com/modulusN.xml.
{ If infrastructural changes for DNSSEC are adopted, `modulus N' for a domain
could be obtained by the DNSSEC [5] or by alternative directory services [8].
In all the above approaches, a client will obtain the `modulus N' for the cor-
responding URL/URI domain and, when the URL-based resource is retrieved by
the speci¯c URL, will isolate the XMLDsig and proceed as detailed in Section
4.1. This approach is scalable and has the advantage that it can be easily de-
ployed without necessarily making infrastructural changes. On the other hand,
this scheme may have to rely on using a reserved relative URL on every domain
(e.g. `modulusN') and an agreed XML schema for `modulus N' distribution (e.g.
for ¯le `modulusN.xml' in the example above).
Scenario 2: IBC for URL-based or URI identi¯ed resources
(`modulus N' obtained from dedicated secure server)
This scenario applies when multiple DNS domains are shared within an organi-
zation or a virtual community. In this case, we assume that a dedicated secure
server can be employed for the distribution of the `modulus N' for URLs andIBC for Integrity and Authenticity of Web Resources 9
URIs available for the participating domains. The client software (or browser
plug-ins) can be con¯gured to contact the designated secure server to obtain
`modulus N' when necessary. This approach has the bene¯t that it does not
require a separate `modulus N' for each DNS domain but it is not scalable and
may require manual con¯guration by the user.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
In this work we described a new approach for authenticity of web resources. Our
proposal has a number of advantages ranging from transparency, ease of use,
and implicit authentication of resources to seamless introduction and support
of context-centric networking and collaboration in virtual communities. Rather
than using certi¯cate based Public Key Cryptography (PKI), our proposal is
based on the use of the more intuitive Identity Based Cryptography. Once re-
sources are signed using a version of RSA called mediated RSA, anybody can
verify the authenticity of these resources simply by using the name (URL/URI)
of the resource as the veri¯cation key. In our proposal, we still need to use a type
of domain certi¯cate that includes the common RSA modulus N, but we should
stress that this \certi¯cate" is not like a normal public key certi¯cate but rather
a long lived attribute certi¯cate for the entire domain that can be retrieved ei-
ther by a dedicated server or by using DNSSEC if infrastructural changes are
adopted (Section 4.2).
One other di®erence with traditional PKI systems is that the private key
is generated by the trusted authority (TA). This enforcement, in general, may
raise concerns related to key escrow and privacy surrounding the management of
private keys. The ¯rst concern is not really an issue in our case since we are only
dealing with signature (correspondingly client veri¯cation) of resources, so no
encryption takes place. For the second concern which may lead to compromise of
private keys and signature non-repudiation once a server has been compromised,
one could use multiple servers and threshold cryptography. Furthermore, the use
of the SEM ensures that an attacker must compromise both to undermine the
security of the system.
Our approach opens some interesting directions for research. We plan to in-
vestigate performance issues when signing content of di®erent types and sizes.
This is an issue that needs to be addressed since most of the web tra±c increase
over the last few years has been attributed to the exchange of large volume mul-
timedia content. We also plan to identify further requirements to support col-
laborative authoring of resources in virtual communities and investigate the use
of OpenID to let authors sign portions of collaboratively produced documents,
which, in turn, could be double signed by the domain of the community. The
management of resources, private keys and signatures to support both modes
can be a challenging task that we aim to explore further.10 T. Tiropanis and T. Dimitriou
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